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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ON APPEAL 
On October 10, 2008, members of the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force 
responded to a citizen tip at the Templin's resort in Post Falls Idaho, near the Spokane 
River. The basis of the tip was that the citizen felt that there was a lot of unusual traffic 
going in and out of the boat owned by Defendant, Mr. Howard W. Linenberger Jr. 
NARCOTICS OFFENSE INVESTIGATION NARRATIVE, DET. MASON. 
Detective Mason knocked on the door of the boat and "announced himself." Id. 
When Mr. Linenberger and his female companion "exited the lower part of the boat and 
came up," Detective Mason demanded that they "step with us to the dock so we could 
talk." Id. Detective Mason wrote in his report that "since it is common Law 
Enforcement knowledge that people selling/using drugs often carry weapons," he asked 
Mr. Linenberger ifhe could pat search him for weapons." Id. The detained Mr. 
Linenberger agreed. Id. During the patdown search of Mr. Linenberger, Officer Mason 
reported that he could feel a "round cylindrical shaped object "commonly used to 
transport or use illegal drugs from." Id. The cylinder was seized, and laid on the ground. 
Id. 
Detective Mason then began interrogating the detained Mr. Linenberger about the 
presence of drugs in the boat, who then was asked to consent to the search of his boat and 
car, after Detective Mason promised Mr. Linenberger that he would not be arrested or 
charged with a crime, telling him that "no one needed to go to jail today." Id. The boat 
was searched and drugs and paraphernalia were found. A Motion to Suppress was 
timely filed by trial counsel, and oral argument was heard on March 13,2009. After the 
hearing and briefing on the issues, the Honorable Lansing Haynes denied Mr. 
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Linenberger's Motion to Suppress. Mr. Linenberger entered a conditional guilty plea to 
the resulting charges, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the Motion to Suppress. 
This appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Mr. Linenberger had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his boat that is 
recognized by the Fourth Amendment 
A person challenging a search has the burden of showing that he or she had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place searched. That involves a two-part 
inquiry: 1). Did the person have a SUbjective expectation of privacy in the object of the 
challenged search? 2). Is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?" A 
structure need not be one's "house" in order for the occupant to have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy there. In State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623,626 (2008), this Court 
ruled that that Defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his "hooch," a 
temporary shelter that a homeless person lived in on publicly-owned forest land. 
Other courts that have analyzed the issue of expectation of privacy in boat 
cognizable under the Fourth Amendment have had varying results, depending upon the 
Defendants' ownership of the boat and whether they resided in the boat, and whether they 
were on board the boat at the time of the contested search. Cf: United States of America, 
Plaintiff-appellant, v. Felix Joseph Vicknair, 610 F.2d 372 (5th Circuit 1980) (no 
expectation of privacy where defendants were not on the boat and were not owners of 
boat at time of search); u.s. V Quinn 475 U.S. 791;106 S.Ct. 1623; 89 L.Ed.2d 803 
(1986) (No expectation of privacy in boat purchased for drug smuggling and owner of 
boat had no personal effects in boat at time of boarding). Here, it is undisputed that Mr. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page 4 
I 
Linenberger was the registered owner of the boat, had his personal effects in it, and was 
known by the police to be its occupant. Mr. Linenberger had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his boat that the Fourth Amendment recognizes. 
B. Mr. Linenberger was illegally detained without reasonable articulable suspicion 
when his person was searched and when he "consented" to the search of his 
boat 
At the time he knocked on the boat's cabin door and ordered Mr. Linenberger out 
of the boat and onto the dock, Detective Mason did not possess sufficiently reliable 
information that established a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 
Therefore the detention, patdown search, resulting statements and alleged consent to 
search were Fruits of the Poisonous Tree and were obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491,103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1,88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). 
This was not a voluntary encounter between the police and a citizen that does not 
invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Here, Detective Mason boarded the 
boat without permission, knocked on the door of the boat, and ordered Mr. Linenberger 
to the dock. Clearly this was a detention without reasonable suspicion prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment. "The test to determine whether someone is restrained is whether, 
considering all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 
communicate to a reasonable person that he or she is not at liberty to ignore the police 
presence and go about his or her business. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, III 
S.Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991); State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647 (Ct. App. 2002). Mr. 
Linenberger was confronted in the very limited confines of his boat, was unmistakably 
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i 
ordered out of the boat and onto the deck. He was seized without Reasonable Suspicion 
or Probable Cause within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
C. The Frisk of Mr. Linenberger for weapons lacked reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
In State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655 (2007), the Court clarified and refined the law 
on "stop and frisk" searches, to require that the police have an objective basis for 
believing not only that the individual is armed but also posed a risk of harm to the police 
or others. The officer's SUbjective concerns do not authorize such a search, nor does their 
"experience" that "drug users" frequently possess weapons authorize such a search. 
Accordingly, In Henage, the fact that an otherwise polite and cooperative individual who 
had been detained admitted that he had a knife on his person, did not authorize a frisk or 
search of her person, as there was no objective basis for concluding that he or she 
presented a danger to the officer. 
The frisk of Mr. Linenberger can also not be justified as consensual. An unlawful 
detention or seizure vitiates any subsequently obtained consent. State v. Gutierrez, supra. 
"When police conduct has violated an accused's constitutional rights before he consents 
to a search, the State must show that the consent was not procured by the exploitation of 
the previous illegality." State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 117 (Ct. App. 2007). This search 
is also the product of the unconstitutional entry onto the boat, and should have been 
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 
S.Ct. 407 (1963). The message was clear here: If Mr. Linenberger did not cooperate and 
consent to the search of his boat and person, he would go to jailor be charged with a 
crime. Clearly his "consent" was not freely and voluntarily given in violation ofthe 
Fourth Amendment's proscription against warrantless searches, absent consent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page 6 
i 
D. Mr. Linenberger's consent to search his vehicle and boat were not Freely and 
voluntarily given, therefore the search of the vehicles was in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The Defendant's boat and vehicle were searched without a warrant. The consent 
here was the result of an invalid detention and an invalid "frisk," coupled with promises 
that Defendant would not go to jailor be arrested ifhe "cooperated." 
When the State's justification for a warrantless search is that the Defendant gave 
consent, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was 
voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied. State v. Stewart, 
145 Idaho 641, 647 (Ct. App. 2008). A voluntary decision is one that is the product of an 
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker. And individual's consent is 
involuntary, on the other hand, ifhis will has been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired. In determining whether a subject's will was overborne 
in a particular case, the court must assess the totality of all of the surrounding 
circumstances, both the characteristics of the accused and the details ofthe interrogation. 
Thus whether consent was granted involuntarily, or was the product of coercion, is a 
factual determination to be based on the surrounding circumstances, accounting for subtly 
coercive police questions and the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the party 
granting the consent to the search." State v. Jabarra, 143 Idaho (Ct. App. 2006). 
Here, Mr. Linenberger not only was illegally detained at the time his "consent" 
was extracted, but had previously been frisked in violation of the constitution. A 
reasonable person in that situation, given the control over the situation that Detective 
Mason had already commanded, would have believed they had to consent or be arrested 
and charged with a crime. The consent to search Mr. linenberger's vehicle and boat was 




obtained in violation of the constitution and was fruits of the poisonous tree of the prior 
illegal detention and frisk. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing facts and legal analysis, it is very clear that Mr. 
Linenberger was detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. He was then frisked without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, also in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. His "consent" to the search of his vehicle and boat 
were the product of those previous constitutional violations and was invalid. Appellant 
respectfully submits that this Honorable court must reverse the trial court's Denial of the 
Motion to Suppress, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Submitted this ~~dayofMarch, 2011 
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